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Abstract 
This paper argues against the view that 
Japanese indirect passives are restricted 
with respect to the base verb that they take. 
Specifically, it argues that, despite its 
initial plausibility, the oft-proposed 
generalization that unaccusatives cannot 
appear in indirect passives is too strong and 
the alleged distribution is a tendency at 
most, albeit a strong one. After closely 
examining the restriction along with the 
counterevidence discussed in the literature, 
this paper presents novel empirical 
evidence against the restriction. Moreover, 
it also argues that no stipulations specific to 
indirect passives need to be introduced in 
accounting for the purported evidence for 
the unaccusative restriction: pragmatic 
inferences play a crucial role in deriving 
the observed aversion to unaccusative-
based indirect passives. 
1 Introduction 
Japanese passives have attracted much attention 
and have been a topic of intense debate due to their 
peculiar characteristics which present challenges to 
contemporary linguistic theories. One such 
characteristic is the existence of two types of 
passive: direct and indirect passives. Direct 
passives are passives with the active counterparts, 
where the passive subject corresponds to an object 
in the active, as in (1), whereas indirect passives 
have no such counterparts, as shown in (2).1 
 
(1)  Boku-wa   sensei-ni      home-rare-ta 
     1SG-TOP   teacher-DAT   praise-PASS-PST 
     ‘I was praised by the teacher.’   
   cf. Sensei-ga      boku-o    home-ta 
      teacher-NOM   1SG-ACC  praise-PST 
      ‘The teacher praised me.’ 
(2)   Boku-wa   kodomo-ni   nak-are-ta 
     1SG-TOP    child-DAT   cry-PASS-PST  
  ‘The child cried on me.’  
   cf. Kodomo-ga  (*boku-o/-ni)     nai-ta  
      child-NOM     1SG-ACC/-DAT  cry-PST 
      ‘The child cried (*me).’  
 
Of the many issues brought up by these two 
types of passive, it is sometimes proposed that 
indirect passives are restricted with respect to the 
base verb they take. Specifically, researchers such 
as Dubinsky (1985, 1997), Kageyama (1993, 1996) 
and Washio (1989-90) argue for what we refer to 
as the unaccusative restriction, which bans 
unaccusatives from appearing as the base verb of 
the indirect passive. For instance, Kageyama 
(1996) presents the following examples in (3) and 
                                                          
1 The following abbreviations are used: 1 = first person, 2 = 
second person, ACC = accusative, CAUS = causative, COM = 
comitative, COMP = complementizer, COND = conditional, CONJ 
= conjunction, DAT = dative, DV = dummy verb, GEN = genitive, 
IMP = imperative, INCH = inchoative, INST = instrumental, LOC 
= locative, NEG = negative, NPST = nonpast, PASS = passive, PL 
= plural, POT = potential, pro = null pronoun, PST = past, SG = 
singular, STV = stativizer, TOP = topic. 
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(4), whose base verbs are unergatives and 
unaccusatives, respectively. 
 
(3) a.  Torakku-ni soba-o   hasir-are-ta 
  truck-DAT  side-ACC run-PASS-PST 
  ‘The truck ran by my side on me.’ 
   b.  Titioya-ni   sofaa-de    ner-are-ta 
      father-DAT  couch-LOC  sleep-PASS-PST 
  ‘I was adversely affected by my father 
 sleeping on the couch.’ 
(4) a. *Seiseki-ni  ot-i-rare-ta 
      grade-DAT  fall-INCH-PASS-PST 
      ‘My grades slipped on me.’ 
   b. *Syatyoo-ni     sikyo-s-are-ta 
      president-DAT  death-DV-PASS-PST 
      ‘The president died on us.’ 
(Kageyama, 1996 with minor changes) 
 
This paper attempts to shed some light on 
Japanese indirect passives by placing special focus 
on the unaccusative restriction. Specifically, I will 
make the following two claims: first, the restriction 
is empirically too strong and it is at most a 
tendency, not a solid descriptive generalization; 
second, pragmatic inferences derive the purported 
cases for the unaccusative restriction, which in turn 
proves to be illusionary and superfluous. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
discusses the nature of the unaccusative restriction 
and issues concerning split intransitivity. Section 
2.1 examines the counterevidence pointed out in 
the literature, and then Section 2.2 presents novel 
empirical evidence from two-place unaccusatives. 
Section 3 considers the purported cases for the 
unaccusative restriction and argues that pragmatic 
inferences play a crucial role in accounting for 
them, thereby showing that the unaccusative 
restriction can be dispensed with entirely. Section 
4 concludes the paper.  
Before going into discussion, I would like to 
mention three things that should be kept in mind. 
First, I assume without argument that, aside from 
the customary distinction between direct and 
indirect passives, the distinction between ni-
passives and niyotte-passives is real (Kuroda, 1979 
inter alia) and that ni-passives involve the 
introduction of an affected argument by one type 
of -rare, an unaccusative applicative predicate, as 
in (5)a (cf. Dubinsky, 1985, 1997; Pylkkänen, 
2002), while niyotte-passives involve the 
suppression of the external argument of the base 
verb by another type of -rare, the passive voice 
head (Kratzer, 1996), as in (5)b.  
 
(5) a.  as an applicative predicate (ApplMalefactive)2  
      [[-rare]] = x.e. Affectee(e,x) 
   b.  as the passive voice head (VoicePassive) 
      [[-rare]] = e.x[Agent(e,x)] 
 
Thus, I assume two homophonous morphemes 
which function completely differently. Though I 
consider that the homophony is not accidental and 
should receive a principled explanation along with 
other uses of -rare, I keep to the naïve assumption 
for the purposes of this paper.  
Second, my aim in this paper is rather modest: 
it is to show that no stipulations, syntactic or 
otherwise, need to be introduced in accounting for 
the strong aversion to unaccusative-based indirect 
passives because it can be derived by what we 
already know about pragmatics, and it is not to 
choose between inferential pragmatic theories like 
Grice (1975), Horn (1984), Levinson (1987, 2000), 
and Sperber and Wilson (1995), although I couch 
my analysis in neo-Gricean terms. To this end, I 
simply follow the common view on the divide 
between grammar and pragmatics, with the former 
defined as a set of codes and the latter as inference.  
Finally, there is great variability in acceptability 
judgments, especially when unaccusative-based 
indirect passives are involved. Thus, when I cite 
examples from the previous literature, I cite their 
reported judgments as well, with minor changes 
made to the examples when necessary. While the 
divide appears to be wide between ‘conservative’ 
and ‘liberal’ speakers, it is also true that an 
example once judged as unacceptable can become 
acceptable if a proper context of utterance is 
carefully constructed and provided, suggesting that 
the divide results partly from inadequate control of 
the context of utterance. With this in mind, I will 
spell out contextual and conceptual settings as 
much as possible when I present my analysis.  
2 The Unaccusative Restriction 
As noted above, the unaccusative restriction 
prohibits unaccusative verbs from appearing as the 
base verbs in indirect passives. In addition to (4), I 
give several more examples in (6):  
                                                          
 2 The benefactive counterpart (ApplBenefactive) is as follows:  
 [[-te moraw-]] = x.e. Benefactive (e,x) 
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(6) a. *Nooka-no   hito-tati-wa     kaze-de 
  farmer-GEN  person-PL-TOP  wind-INST 
  ringo-ni    ot-i-rare-ta 
      apple-DAT  fall-INCH-PASS-PST 
 ‘The farmers were adversely affected by the 
 apples’ falling because of the wind.’ 
   b. *Taroo-wa  anata-no   nimotu-ni   
      Taro-TOP  2SG-GEN  belongings-DAT   
      konna  tokoro-ni   ar-are-ta 
      this    place-LOC  be-PASS-PST 
 ‘Taro was adversely affected by your 
 belongings being in this place.’ 
   c. *Taroo-wa situon-ni     ag-ar-are-ta 
      T.-TOP   rm.temp.-DAT rise-INCH-PASS-PST 
  ‘Taro was adversely affected by the room 
 temperature’s rising.’ 
((6)a,b: Kuno and Takami, 2002 w/minor changes) 
((6)c: Dubinsky, 1997 with minor changes) 
 
Moreover, the contrast in (8) below between the 
causative and inchoative forms may also help 
elucidate what the restriction is intended to 
capture: as (7) shows, while both the causative and 
inchoative alternants are fine in the active, they 
show a stark contrast when indirect passives are 
formed from them. Specifically, unlike indirect 
passives based on causatives, as in (8)a, those 
based on inchoatives are quite awkward and 
marked in acceptability, as shown in (8)b.  
 
(7) a.  Kodomo-ga  mado-o       wat-Ø-ta  
      child-NOM   window-ACC  break-CAUS-PST 
      ‘A child broke the window.’ 
   b.  Mado-ga      war-e-ta     
      window-NOM  break-INCH-PST 
      ‘The window broke.’   
(8) a.  Kodomo-ni   mado-o   
      child-DAT    window-ACC   
      war-Ø-are-ta 
      break-CAUS-PASS-PST  
      ‘A child broke the window on me.’ 
   b. *mado-ni       war-e-rare-ta    
      window-DAT   break-INCH-PASS-PST 
  ‘The window broke on me.’ 
((8)b: Washio, 1989-90 with minor changes) 
 
The restriction has sometimes received an 
explanation in terms of the 1-Advancement 
Exclusiveness Law (henceforth, 1AEX). 1AEX is 
originally a law proposed in the framework of 
Relational Grammar (Perlmutter and Postal, 1984), 
which states, in informal terms, that raising to 
subject occurs at most once in a single clause. Thus, 
it precludes cases such as double passives and 
passives based on unaccusatives, both of which 
require raising to subject to occur more than once. 
A contemporary explanation of this law takes the 
suppression of an external argument, as in (5)b, as 
the key component: the process can apply to 
predicates with an external argument like 
transitives and unergatives, but not to those 
without like unaccusatives and passives, given that 
vacuous application is impossible. 
2.1 Evidence against the Restriction 
Although the unaccusative restriction can be 
clearly stated, the situation is not as clear when we 
consider the relevant data because there are two 
complications pertaining to split intransitivity. First, 
it is not always the case that one verb is fixed with 
only one verb class—unergative or unaccusative—
and some verbs display variable behavior with 
respect to the class membership, as shown in (9):3  
 
(9) a. Unergative slide 
      i.  Ted slid into the closet.      
     ii.  The closet was slid into by Ted.  
   b. Unaccusative slide 
      i.  The soap slid into the desk.              
     ii. *The desk was slid into by the soap.  
                   (Perlmutter and Postal, 1984) 
 
Second, these verbs are variable in syntactic 
behavior, depending on the syntactic context where 
they appear. That is, they show unergative 
behavior in some syntactic contexts and 
unaccusative behavior in others, but not both at the 
same time. Given this, if one wants to argue that a 
variable behavior verb is unaccusative in some 
syntactic context C, it only makes sense to show its 
unaccusative status in C, and it may be irrelevant 
to the argument to do so in other contexts. 
With these in mind, let us turn to the following 
three types of counterevidence to the unaccusative 
restriction pointed out in the literature. 
First, consider cases where the same verb 
appears to display different behavior. Kuno and 
Takami (2002) take the contrast in (10) as counter 
to the unaccusative restriction on the assumption 
that the base verb is invariable as unaccusative.  
                                                          
3 See Borer (2005) for more on variable behavior verbs. 
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(10)  a. *Dentyuu-ni      tao-re-rare-ta   
       utility.pole-DAT  fall-INCH-PASS-PST 
 ‘The utility pole fell down on me.’ 
    b.  Dooryoo-ni     tao-re-rare-ta  
       coworker-DAT   fall-INCH-PASS-PST 
 ‘The coworker got ill on me.’  
(Kuno and Takami, 2002 with changes) 
 
However, the restriction can still be defended if the 
verb is variable in such a way that it is 
unaccusative in (10)a but unergative in (10)b, as in 
(9). Thus, for (10)b to be true counterevidence, it 
must be demonstrated that the verb is unaccusative 
in its behavior in the syntactic context of (10)b.  
It is well known that floated numeral quantifiers 
(henceforth, (F)NQ) in Japanese can be used as a 
test for unaccusativity (Miyagawa, 1989a): 
unaccusative subjects can be associated with 
floated numeral quantifiers, as in (11)a, while 
unergative subjects cannot, as in (11)b.  
 
(11)  a.  Gakusei-ga   ofisu-ni  huta-ri ki-ta  
       student-NOM  office-to  two-CL come-PST  
       ‘Two students came to the office.’ 
    b. *Gakusei-ga   zibun-no kane-de 
       student-NOM  self-GEN  money-INST 
       huta-ri  denwa-si-ta 
       two-CL  telephone-DV-PST 
       ‘Two students called at their own expense.’ 
 
Applying this test to (10)b gives the following 
result:4 
 
(12)    Dooryoo-ni     ofisu-de    batabata-to 
      coworker-DAT   office-LOC  by.turns-COM 
      go-nin ?(-mo)   tao-re-rare-ta 
      5-CL-even     fall-INCH-PASS-PST 
 ‘We had as many as five of coworkers  fall 
down in the office one after another on us.’ 
 
In (12), the locative phrase and the comitative-
marked manner adverbial are added to ensure that 
the NQ is inside the VP, which is a prerequisite for 
the test. The scalar focus particle -mo ‘even’ is also 
added to the NQ and, as indicated, the lack of it 
slightly degrades the acceptability for some reason 
or other. Hence, it is still possible to assume that 
the verb in (10) is uniformly unaccusative, thus 
                                                          
4 Kuno and Takami (2002) also employ this test, but they do 
not apply it in the relevant context.  
taking (10)b to be a true counterexample, but this 
holds with the proviso that more research is needed 
to clarify whatever effects the focus particle has on 
the FNQ test.  
The next case, also discussed by Kuno and 
Takami (2002), involves another unaccusative 
diagnostic in Japanese, accusative case marking 
with Sino-Japanese roots (Miyagawa, 1989b): it is 
possible with unergative or transitive roots, as in 
(13), but not with unaccusative roots, as in (14). 
 
(13)   a.  Taroo-wa   iede(-o)         si-ta 
        Taro-TOP   house.out-ACC   do-PST 
        ‘Taro ran away from home.’ 
     b.  John-wa   murabito-ni    ookami-ga   
        John-TOP  villagers-DAT  wolf-NOM 
        ku-ru-to           keikoku(-o)   si-ta 
        come-NPST-COMP   warning-ACC  do-PST 
  ‘John gave the villagers the warning that a 
 wolf is coming.’ 
(Grimshaw and Mester, 1988 with minor changes) 
 
(14)   a.  Taroo-wa  sono  kekka-o    kii-te   
        Taro-TOP  that   result-ACC  hear-CONJ 
        zetuboo(??-o)   si-ta  
        despair-ACC    DV-PST 
        ‘Hearing the result, Taro despaired.’ 
     b.  Taroo-ga kaidan-de  tentoo(*-o) si-ta 
        T.-NOM  stairs-LOC fall-ACC    DV-PST 
        ‘Taro fell down in the stairs.’ 
(Kageyama, 1993 with minor changes) 
 
Thus, while restricted in its scope, accusative case 
marking can be used as a test for unaccusativity, 
and, as shown in (15), unaccusatives can indeed 
appear in indirect passives. 
 
(15)  a.  Sonna  koto-de    kimi-ni   zetuboo(*-o) 
       that    thing-INST 2SG-DAT despair-ACC 
       s-are-tara        komar-u 
       DV-PASS-COND   get.annoyed-NPST 
 ‘It bothers me if you despair of that.’ 
    b.  Titi-ni      tentoo(*-o) s-are-ta 
       father-DAT  fall-ACC    DV-PASS-PST  
 ‘My father fell in the stairs on me.’ 
(Kuno and Takami, 2002 with minor changes) 
 
Finally, consider non-alternating unaccusatives, 
like sin(-u) ‘die’ and hur(-u) ‘fall’, which can 
appear in indirect passives, as shown in (16). 
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(16)  a.  Titioya-ni   sin-are-ta  
       father-DAT  die-PASS-PST 
       ‘My father died on me.’ 
    b.  Ame-ni    hur-are-ta 
       rain-DAT  fall-PASS-PST 
       ‘It rained on me’ (Lit.: ‘Rain fell on me.’) 
 
These verbs are unaccusative when they appear in 
indirect passives, as shown by the FNQ test in (17). 
 
(17)  a.  Sensee-wa    osiego-ni     sensoo-tyuu  
       teacher-TOP    student-DAT   war-during 
       nampoo-de  zyuu-nin-mo   sin-are-ta 
       south-LOC   10-CL-even    die-PASS-PST 
‘The teacher had as many as ten students 
die in the south during the war.’ 
    b.  Sansei-u-ni     ip-pun-kan-ni          
       acid-rain-DAT   one-min.-period-LOC    
       zyuu-miri-mo         hur-are-ta 
       10-millimeter-even   fall-PASS-PST 
 ‘Acid rain fell as much as 10mm for 1 min. 
on us.’ 
 
While Washio (1989-90) treats these verbs as 
unaccusatives immune to 1AEX, Kageyama (1993, 
1996) classifies them as unergatives, assuming that 
only unergatives can form imperatives. See (18):  
 
(18)  a.  Hayaku  sin-e 
       soon     die-IMP 
       “Die soon.” 
    b.  Ame,  ame,  hur-e,     hur-e 
       rain   rain   fall-IMP  fall-IMP 
       “Rain, fall!” 
(Kageyama, 1993) 
 
However, as Matsumoto (2000) correctly points 
out, unaccusative imperatives can be used to 
represent a wish of the speaker, and it is exactly 
the case with (18). Hence, unaccusatives as well as 
unergatives can form imperatives after all. 
Taking the preceding two arguments together, 
we can conclude that non-alternating unaccusatives 
are neither unergatives nor variable behavior verbs 
functioning as such in indirect passives. Therefore, 
they also falsify the unaccusative restriction. 
In sum, we have examined the counterevidence 
in the literature carefully, keeping in mind the 
caveat against confusing the different uses of 
variable behavior verbs, and demonstrated that the 
unaccusative restriction is too strong, as it would 
wrongly exclude cases like (10)b, (15) and (17).  
2.2 New Evidence from Two-place Verbs 
We have so far considered the counterevidence to 
the unaccusative restriction in the literature. The 
counterevidence examined involved only one-place 
verbs. In this subsection, I will present new 
evidence against the restriction involving two-
place unaccusative verbs. Consider (19) below: 
 
(19)    Pittyaa-ga    {kare-no/zibun-no/Ø}  
      pitcher-NOM   he-GEN/self-GEN/pro  
      ude-o     ot-Ø-ta  
      arm-ACC  break-CAUS-PST 
      ‘The pitcher broke his arm.’ 
 
The subject in (19) can be construed in two ways, 
as an agent, who did the breaking, or as an affectee, 
whose arm underwent the breaking. 
The fact that the ambiguity is not illusionary 
can be shown by the following example, where the 
agentive interpretation is negated and the affectee 
interpretation survives. 
 
(20)    Pittyaa1-ga    {kare1-no/zibun1-no/Ø1}   
      pitcher-NOM   he-GEN/self-GEN/pro  
      ude-o     ot-Ø-ta          kedo,  
      arm-ACC  break-CAUS-PST  but     
      zibun1-de-wa    or-Ø-anak-at-ta 
      self-INST-TOP   break-CAUS-NEG-DV-PST 
  ‘The pitcher broke his arm, but he didn’t 
 break it himself.’ 
 
To obtain this kind of ambiguity, there are two 
conditions to be met (Inoue 1976): (i) a verb must 
be such that it does not necessarily select an agent 
(e.g., causative/inchoative verbs); (ii) there must be 
a “proximate” relation (e.g., inalienable possession 
relation) between the subject and the object. Thus, 
the ambiguity cannot be obtained with non-
alternating verbs like nagur(-u) ‘punch’ in (21)a. 
This can be demonstrated by the conjunction test, 
as given in (21)b, where the sentence results in a 
contradiction due to the unambiguous subject. 
 
(21) a.  Pittyaa1-ga   {kare1-no/zibun1-no/Ø1}   
       pitcher-NOM  he-GEN/self-GEN/pro    
       ude-o     nagut-ta 
       ude-ACC   punch-PST 
       ‘The pitcher punched his arm.’ 
258
    b. *Pittyaa1-ga   {kare1-no/zibun1-no/Ø1}    
       pitcher-NOM  he-GEN/self-GEN/pro 
       ude-o     nagut-ta    kedo, 
       ude-ACC   punch-PST  but 
       zibun1-de-wa    nagur-anak-at-ta 
       self-INST-TOP   punch-NEG-DV-PST 
 ‘*The pitcher punched his arm, but he 
didn’t punch it himself.’ 
 
The lack of a “proximate” relation also makes the 
ambiguity unavailable, as shown in (22). 
 
(22) a.  Pittyaa1-ga    {kare1-no/zibun1-no/Ø1}   
       pitcher-NOM   he-GEN/self-GEN/pro  
       batto-o           ot-Ø-ta 
       baseball.bat-ACC  break-CAUS-PST 
       ‘The pitcher broke his baseball bat.’ 
    b. *Pittyaa1-ga   {kare1-no/zibun1-no/Ø1}    
       pitcher-NOM  he-GEN/self-GEN/pro 
       batto-o           ot-Ø-ta          kedo, 
       baseball.bat-ACC  break-CAUS-PST  but 
       zibun1-de-wa   or-Ø-anak-at-ta 
       self-INST-TOP  break-CAUS-NEG-DV-PST 
 ‘*The pitcher broke his baseball bat, but he 
didn’t break it himself.’  
 
Moreover, the ambiguity becomes unavailable 
even when the two conditions are met, if the 
sentence undergoes niyotte-passive formation, 
which serves to eliminate the affectee reading, as 
shown in (23).  
 
(23)   *Pittyaa1-no    ude-ga     kare1-niyotte   
      pitcher-GEN   arm-NOM   he-by       
      or-Ø-are-ta            kedo, 
      break-CAUS-PASS-PST   but 
      kare.zisin1-wa   or-Ø-anak-at-ta 
      he.self-TOP     break-CAUS-NEG-DV-PST 
  ‘*The pitcher’s arm was broken by him, but 
 he didn’t break it himself.’ 
 
Furthermore, the affectee subject passes the 
FNQ test, as in (24). 
 
(24)    Gakusei-ga   ziko-de       san-nin 
      student-NOM  accident-LOC  three-CL 
      ude-o     ot-Ø-ta          kedo  minna 
      arm-ACC  break-CAUS-PST  but    all 
      zibun-de-wa   or-Ø-anak-at-ta 
      self-INST-TOP  break-CAUS-NEG-DV-PST 
‘Three (of the) students broke their arm in 
the accident, but they all didn’t break it 
themselves.” 
 
The facts that only the agentive interpretation 
survives in niyotte-passives and that the affectee 
subject passes the FNQ test strongly suggest that 
the verb is unaccusative with the affectee subject. 
If unaccusatives can appear in indirect passives, 
it is predicted that sentences with the affectee 
subject can be embedded under indirect passives. 
This prediction is borne out, with the affectee 
argument marked dative in this case, as shown in 
(25): the sentence can be construed in such a way 
that the pitcher didn’t cause, but his arm underwent, 
the breaking. 
 
(25)    Kantoku-ga   pittyaa1-ni    ziko-de     
      coach-NOM   pitcher-DAT   accident-LOC 
      Ø1   ude-o     or-Ø-are-ta 
      pro  arm-ACC  break-CAUS-PASS-PST 
‘The coach had the pitcher break his arm in 
 an accident on him.’  
 
All in all, substantial evidence points to the 
unaccusative restriction being too strong. 
Therefore, the alleged generalization is a tendency 
at most, and unaccusatives, monadic or dyadic, can 
appear as the base verb in indirect passives.  
3 Deriving the Unaccusative Restriction 
Effects 
We have seen that the unaccusative restriction is 
not valid as a descriptive generalization and what it 
is intended to capture is a tendency at most. 
However, the observed tendency is so strong that it 
is quite unlikely that an array of facts arises from 
accidents. Thus, there still remains something that 
demands an explanation. 
In this section, I attempt to give an account of 
the observed tendency with an eye to dispensing 
with stipulations specific to indirect passives as 
much as possible. The basic line of thought I 
would like to pursue is that the aversion to 
unaccusative-based indirect passives comes from 
the preference for other alternatives, which arises 
as a result of pragmatic inferences. In a nutshell, if 
an unaccusative-based indirect passive is 
unacceptable, it is infelicitous because there is a 
better alternative: its causative-based counterpart 
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or active counterpart. Moreover, if it is still 
unacceptable with no better alternative, this results 
from the failure in the access to the relevant 
conceptual setting. 
In the following, I will present an analysis in 
three steps, with the help of neo-Gricean principles. 
3.1 The Q-Principle at Work: The Preference 
for Causatives over Inchoatives  
If you consider again the unacceptable examples of 
unaccusative-based indirect passive that we saw in 
Sections 1 and 2, you will notice that the observed 
tendency is in large part supported by those with 
the inchoative alternants of causative-inchoative 
verbs. Moreover, replacing the inchoative verb 
with its causative counterpart renders the sentence 
acceptable, as shown by the contrast in (8), 
repeated here as (26) below. 
 
(26)  a.  Kodomo-ni   mado-o   
       child-DAT    window-ACC   
       war-Ø-are-ta 
       break-CAUS-PASS-PST  
       ‘A child broke the window on me.’ 
    b. *mado-ni       war-e-rare-ta    
       window-DAT   break-INCH-PASS-PST 
 ‘The window broke on me.’ 
 
I argue that part of the tendency can be restated 
in such a way that the causative alternant is 
preferred over its inchoative counterpart as the 
base verb in indirect passives, and moreover that 
this preference can be reduced to the classic 
observation on the use of the two alternants in 
general (Fillmore, 1981; McCawley, 1978, 1989): 
“you must expressly indicate an agent’s 
involvement in an event [with the causative 
alternant -TT] as soon as you know of the agent’s 
involvement in it” (McCawley, 1989: 315).  
This observation can be reduced further to the 
following principle of neo-Gricean pragmatics:5 
 
(27)   The Q-Principle 
   a. Horn (1984)  
Say as much as you can [given I]. (p.13) 
   b. Levinson (1987) 
 Do not provide a statement that is 
informationally weaker than your knowledge 
of the world allows, unless providing a 
                                                          
5 The I-Principle corresponds to Horn’s (1984) R-Principle.  
stronger statement would contravene the I-
principle (p.401) 
 
In light of the Q-Principle, causative-based indirect 
passives like (26)a are more informative than, and 
thus are preferred over, those based on the 
inchoative alternants like (26)b, in the context 
where there is a salient agent in the embedded 
event. The use of the inchoative implies otherwise, 
thereby resulting in infelicity.  
As it only partially explains the contrast in (26), 
the Q-Principle does not explain why (26)b is 
infelicitous when there is no contextually salient 
agent in the embedded event. We will turn to this 
in the next subsection. 
3.2 The I-Principle at Work: The Preference 
for Actives over Indirect Passives 
As the Q-Principle is operative, the I-Principle, 
given in (28), is also at work, being responsible for 
the preference for actives over their corresponding 
indirect passives: 
 
(28)   The I-Principle  
   a. Horn (1984)  
Say no more than you must [given Q]. (p.13) 
   b. Levinson (1987) 
Say as little as necessary, i.e. produce the 
minimal linguistic information sufficient to 
achieve your communicational ends (bearing 
the Q-principle in mind) (p.402) 
 
When we compare an indirect passive and its 
active counterpart with respect to informativeness, 
it is always the case that the former is more 
informative than, i.e. asymmetrically entails, the 
latter, with the difference being that the former 
expresses a relation in which the individual 
introduced by the indirect passive morpheme is 
adversely affected by the embedded event. Thus, if 
it is unclear to the hearer how the adverse relation 
is established between the individual and the 
embedded event, then the use of an indirect passive 
makes the utterance irrelevant and unnecessary, 
and that of its corresponding active form suffices.  
For brevity’s sake, I assume that indirect 
passives based on causatives (or, transitives for 
that matter) trivially satisfy the I-Principle because 
there is no observed aversion to them and it is 
fairly easy to come up with contexts where the 
adverse relation is properly established. 
260
This said, consider the following examples:  
 
(29)  a. *Kigi-ni        seityoo-s-are-te  
       tree.tree-DAT   growth-DV-PASS-CONJ 
       uti-ni       hi-ga     atar-anai (<-anak-Ø) 
       home-DAT  sun-NOM hit-NEG-NPST 
‘I am adversely affected by the trees 
growing, which blocks out the sunlight on 
my house.’ 
    a'. Kigi-ga         seityoo-si-te      […] 
       tree.tree-NOM   growth-DV-CONJ 
    b. *Okane-ni     naku-nar-are-te  
       money-DAT   lost-INCH-PASS-CONJ 
       kaimono-ga     deki-nak-at-ta 
       shopping-NOM  do.POT-NEG-DV-PST 
‘My money disappeared on me and I could 
not do the shopping.’ 
    b'. Okane-ga     naku-nat-te        […] 
       money-NOM  lost-INCH- CONJ 
 
(29)a involves a non-alternating unaccusative, and 
(29)b the inchoative alternant. Moreover, for (29)b, 
suppose the context where there is no salient agent 
in the embedded event. In both the examples, 
though some unfavorable consequence is explicitly 
stated in the second conjunct to facilitate the 
judgments, the active form is preferred over the 
indirect passive counterpart. This is because, in 
normal situations, it is nonsense to attribute 
responsibility to inanimate objects, such as trees or 
money, which have no control over what happened. 
Therefore, since it makes no sense unless some 
special context is given, the use of an indirect 
passive is irrelevant and unnecessary, and thus, 
that of its active counterpart is more preferable.  
In accounting for (29), I mention the dative 
subject of the embedded event being responsible 
for it, following the spirit of Kuno and Takami 
(2002), who invoke the notion of animacy and 
propose the hierarchy expressing preference for the 
dative subject (i.e., human > animate > natural 
force > inanimate).  
I take a step forward by arguing that Kuno and 
Takami’s hierarchy can be captured in terms of 
Dowty’s (1991) proto-agent properties in (30), 
with the hierarchy effects dissolved into the 
number of proto-agent properties that the dative 
subject has. Moreover, for an indirect passive to be 
felicitous with an inanimate, insentient being as the 
embedded dative subject, it should be understood 
as having at least (30)c and hence some degree of 
controllability over the event in which it is a 
participant; otherwise, the use of the indirect 
passive would be infelicitous, as shown in (29). 6 
 
(30)   Contributing properties for Proto-agent  
   a. volitional involvement in the event or state 
   b. sentience (and/or perception) 
   c. causing an event or change of state in another 
     participant 
   d. movement (relative to the position of another 
     participant) 
   (e. exists independently of the event named by    
     the verb) 
(Dowty, 1991: 572) 
 
It should be emphasized that in Dowty’s 
original system, proto-role properties are lexical 
entailments coded by the predicate. Here I assume 
that they are also properties that are inferred for the 
satisfaction of the I-Principle. In other words, they 
can contribute to pragmatic meaning as well as 
lexical semantic meaning. Thus, it is possible that, 
even when a predicate does not entail the sentience 
of an argument that it takes, the argument should 
be understood as sentient as imposed by the I-
Principle and allowed by the context.  
Returning to indirect passives based on the 
inchoative alternants of causative/inchoative verbs 
like (26)b and (29)b, it is now clear that they end 
up violating either the Q- or the I-Principle, 
irrespective of the presence of a salient agent in the 
embedded event. Likewise, indirect passives based 
on non-alternating unaccusatives violate the I-
Principle. This way, we effectively derive the 
aversion to unaccusative-based indirect passives, 
without making recourse to stipulations such as the 
unaccusative restriction. Note, however, that this 
only holds when normal contexts are involved, and, 
in what follows, we will see cases where 
unaccusative-based indirect passives are allowed.  
To sum up, the aversion to unaccusative-based 
indirect passives is in fact the preference for such 
alternatives as causative-based indirect passives or 
unaccusative actives, which can be explained in 
terms of the general neo-Gricean principles. 
Therefore, pragmatic inferences play a crucial role 
in deriving the unaccusative restriction effects. 
                                                          
6 Natural phenomena such as rain seem irrelevant to (30), but 
the required adverse relation can be easily established for them, 
thereby satisfying the I-Principle. 
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3.3 When Unaccusative-based Indirect 
Passives are Felicitous 
If the present approach is on the right track, it is 
predicted that unaccusative-based indirect passives 
are felicitous when they best satisfy both the Q- 
and the I-Principles. Specifically, they should be 
possible if the following two conditions are met: (i) 
there should be no contextually salient agent in the 
embedded event; (ii) the individual introduced by 
the indirect passive morpheme must be adversely 
affected by the embedded event for which its 
dative subject argument is responsible. In the 
following, I will show two cases which satisfy both. 
First, consider again the examples with an 
animate being as the embedded dative subject, as 
in (10)b, (15), and (16)a. They are felicitous 
because they can be construed as utterances in the 
contexts which trivially satisfy both (i) and (ii): the 
dative subject is sentient and with some degree of 
controllability, and thus it can be held responsible 
for what happened. Thus, the prediction is clearly 
borne out, and as far as I can see, this much is 
uncontroversial.  
The other case which satisfies both (i) and (ii) 
involves inanimate beings as the dative subject, 
and most examples of this kind fall under the M-
Principle of Levinson (2000), given in (31), and 
they vary greatly in acceptability judgments.7 
 
(31)   The M-Principle  (Levinson 2000: 136) 
Indicate an abnormal, non-stereotypical 
situation by using expressions that contrast 
with those you would use to describe the 
corresponding normal, stereotypical situation. 
 
Simply put, according to the M-Principle, the 
use of a marked expression will implicate a marked 
message or situation. Such a message or situation 
often requires the hearer to stretch the imagination 
so as to comprehend the relevant conceptual 
setting, and thus, the acceptability of the marked 
expression depends on whether or not that relevant 
conceptual setting can be successfully accessed or 
not. The successful access renders the marked 
expression acceptable and felicitous, while the 
failure in the access renders it unacceptable and 
unnecessary, eventually the expression resulting in 
a violation of the I-Principle.  
                                                          
7 We are not concerned with the question of whether the M-
Principle is an epiphenomenon. 
With this consideration in mind, let us quickly 
go over the following two examples, one involving 
a marked situation and the other a marked message. 
I do not discuss their acceptability status, only 
explicating their marked contexts of utterance.8  
Suppose the following marked situation: Taro 
had an artificial tooth for one of his upper front 
teeth, but he was annoyed because it frequently 
came out despite all his efforts to the contrary. It 
just came out by itself again and again. What was 
worse, his tooth came out at one of the most 
inappropriate occasions, when he was on a lunch 
date. Later, in response to the question of how the 
date went, Taro described the incident as follows:  
 
(32)   Mata   ha-ni       nuk-e-rare-ta 
     again   tooth-DAT  come.out-INCH-PASS-PST 
  ‘My tooth came out on me again.’ 
 
Next, suppose the following context: due to a 
sharp decline in BMR in his mid-thirties combined 
with a fattening diet, Taro gained 10 kg in one 
month. Since he did not want to accept the rightful 
responsibility for the result of his action, he said 
the following in an attempt to impute his 
overweight to something else:9 
 
(33)   Ikinari   taizyuu-ni   
     abruptly  weight-DAT  
     hu-e-rare-ta (<huy-e-rare-ta) 
     increase-INCH-PASS-PST 
     ‘Weight gain happened abruptly on me.’ 
 
These examples will lend further support to the 
present approach, provided that they are acceptable.  
In this subsection, we have seen that 
unaccusative-based indirect passives are acceptable 
when the pragmatic principles are satisfied. 
Moreover, in case they are still unacceptable, the 
unacceptability results from the failure in the 
access to the relevant conceptual setting. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
We started with the validity of the unaccusative 
restriction and rejected it in the presence of a 
variety of counterevidence. Instead, we provided 
an alternative pragmatic account, couched in neo-
                                                          
8  Even for the ‘conservative’ speakers, who detest them, 
anthropomorphosis, or personification, works as a wildcard. 
9 This falls under the case of flouting the Q-Principle.  
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Gricean terms, for the unaccusative restriction 
effects, i.e. the aversion to unaccusative-based 
indirect passives. The current approach derives the 
effects without stipulations specific to indirect 
passives, while leaving room for exceptional 
instances to the restriction, which I take to be an 
advantage over the rigid syntactic approach. 
Since this paper is quite restricted in its scope, 
there are many questions that are left out. One 
question particularly relevant to the present 
account is how to define the alternatives. In this 
paper, I simply take it for granted that causative-
based indirect passives and active unaccusatives 
are among the alternatives to consider in the 
process of pragmatic inferencing. Needless to say, 
a complete account should give an analysis of what 
mechanism makes such competition possible. 
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